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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
1:-L\LT LAI{E CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of Utah,
and J. BRACKEN LEE,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.-

~

THE METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE
CITY, a corporation, and
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendants and Respondents

Case No.

9617

Brief of Defendant and Respondent
The Metropolitan Water District
of Salt Lake City
Hereinafter appellant Salt Lake City will be referred to as the City, the respondent The Metropolitan
\Vater District of Salt Lake City as the District, and Salt
Lake County as the County.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' statement of facts consists of erroneous
statements and interpretations of the evidence together
with arguments and conclusions of law with which we
cannot agree. We therefore modify it as stated below.
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On August 7, 1961 the Board of Directors of the District acting pursuant to Section 73-8-36 determined by
resolution that the amount of money necessary to be
raised by taxation during the fiscal year beginning the
1st day of January, 1961, and ending the 31st day of December, 1961, for all District purposes is the sum of
$639,690.00 and levied a tax against all of the taxable
property in the District at a rate of 25c upon each $100.00
of the assessed valuation of that property. The resolution in accord with the provisions of Section 73-8-37 directed that in lieu of the tax levied the City could pay
on or before August 27, 1961, the sum of $639,690.00
(R. 8). On August 10, the City notified the District that
it did not elect to pay the sum stated in lieu of the tax
(Ex. 2).
At the time the tax was levied, the District had on
hand United States Government securities worth in excess of two million dollars, which were convertible into
cash at anytime (Ex. 3, R. 50). It is these securities that
are characterized by the plaintiffs as a cash surplus.
The financial statement and supplemental schedules
(Ex. 3) prepared by the accountants also indicated that
on December 31, 1960, the District had on hand cash in
the sum of $640,437.35. The evidence revealed, however,
that the two million dollars in securities had been allocated to a number of projects designed to obtain new
supplies of water and to avert a shortage due to existing
and anticipated drouth conditions. The cash on hand
December 30, 1960, had been used by the District to pay
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3
fixed obligations, before the August, 1961 tax was levied
(Ex. 6).
The two million dollar investment is a fund reserved
by the District to meet emergencies that arise in the
course of performance of the functions for which the District wa.s created (Ex. 6). It was accumulated over a
period of years out of profits which the District derived
from the sale of water other than that sold to and consumed within the City (R. 47). It had been resorted to
from time to time in the past to meet such emergencies
(R. 47).
In determining the amount of money necessary to be
raised by taxation during the year 1961, the Board took
into consideration a number of circumstances. In the
first place there was a pressing necessity to increase the
delivery capacity of the Deer Creek Aqueduct. The gravity flow rate of 155 c. f. s. had been demonstrated to be
insufficient during the peak demands of the hot summer
months. If the aqueduct could be converted from gravity to pressure flow, the delivery rate could be greatly
increased. To determine whether this conversion was
feasible, it was necessary to make pressure tests and
hydraulic studies. The estimated cost of the conversion
was between three and five hundred thousand dollars.
Ten Thousand Dollars was appropriated to make the
tests and studies necessary to determine the feasibility
of the project. The Board plans to complete this project,
if feasible, by resorting to the reserve fund, instead of
levying a special tax (Ex. 1).
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The existing water storage facilities of the District
and the City are inadequate to meet the demands of the
rapidly increasing urban population (R. 34). An additional reservoir is needed, not only to meet the ordinary peak
water demands, but also to assure an adequate supply
for fire protection and preservation of public health
(Ex. 1). The District owns fifty acres of land on Wasatch
Boulevard which it acquired in 1947 in anticipation of the
necessity for such reservoir (R. 40-41). Preliminary tests
and engineering studies had to be made to determine the
costs and conflicts which might arise out of the establishment of the highway known as the Belt Route. It was
expected that the cost of the reservoir would exceed a
million two hundred fifty thousand dollars, and again the
Board planned to meet this cost from accumulated funds
without levying a special tax against the property within
the District (Ex. 1).
At the time the resolution was passed, drouth conditions had become acute and if they continued according
to the usual pattern, a critical shortage of water was certain to occur in the very near future (Ex. 1, p. 5 and 6).
The District had explored a number of possibilities of
averting this crisis (Ex. 1, p. 6). Negotiations had been
underway to purchase water from farmers, upon the basis
of the value of crops lost (Ex. 1, p. 6). Four hundred
thousand dollars out of the reserve fund was earmarked
to purchase this water (Ex. 6, p. 6).
Additional supplies of water could also be obtained
by drilling deep wells. Two hundred thousand dollars
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out of the reserve fund was allocated to the drilling and
equipping of four deep wells (Ex. 6, p. 6).
Sometime ago, the City had made application to
appropriate the spring run-off in Little Cottonwood
Creek. It could not complete its application, because of
financial inability to construct the necessary diverting
and storage facilities. It transferred its application to
the District under an agreement whereby the latter would
undertake to furnish these facilities (R. 62). The :first
of these diverting works required was the construction
of a reservoir, and a site known as Dimple Dell was
under survey by the District. Extensive core drilling
had to be done to determine the suitability of this site
and an appropriation of $30,000 out of the reserve fund
was made to do this work (Ex. 1).
These proposed expenditures to meet the emergencies confronting the District together with the cost of
pressurizing the aqueduct and constructing the Wasatch
reservoir would have exhausted the reserve fund. The
District, of course, had to meet its :fixed obligations and
pay its operating expenses. If all of the projected expenditures had been made, the reserve fund and all income
including the 1961 tax would have been used up and the
District would have only an estimated $29,000.00 remaining at the end of the year 1962 (Ex. 1).
Appellants' brief emphasizes twice in capital letters
the net income from operations shown on page 4 of Exhibit 3. Actually, this item is of little significance when
it is considered that the question before the District in
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August, 1961 was the amount necessary to be raised by
taxation to carry on the operations of the District. In the
first place, the Exhibit speaks as of the end of the year
1960, and does not purport to show anything with respect
to the financial condition existing at the time the tax was
levied. Furthermore, the net income shown on page 4
is simply the difference between the income derived from
water sales, aqueduct rentals and water treatment, and
the cost of operating the actual physical properties of the
District. It does not purport to show the large amounts
expended by the District during the year for capital improvements to its properties. A list of these expenditures
will be found on page 18 of Exhibit 3. They amount to
approximately $850,000. Neither does it take into account
the stock assessments paid amounting to $277,650, nor the
item $310,000 paid to the Bureau of Reclamation. Finally, it does not include payments made on the bonded
indebtedness of the District amounting to $295,500, nor
other items totaling more than $36,000.
Actually, Exhibit 3 discloses that the revenue or
income of the District for 1960, including the 2% mill tax
of more than $600,000 was not sufficient to pay the cost of
carrying on the business of the District. Even if the Directors of the District had no other facts before them
than those disclosed in Exhibit 3, they would have been
fully justified in determining as they did that it was necessary to levy the 2¥2 mill tax in August, 1961 in order
to carry on the functions of the District.
The only question with which we are now concerned
is whether the Board was justified in determining that
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it was necessary to levy the tax in August, 1961 in order
to carry on the business of the District.. The Appellants
made no attempt to present any evidence to impeach the
Board's determination of the necessity of levying the
1961 case. The evidence is clear that if the Board had
not levied the 1961 tax, it would have been compelled
to practically exhaust its reserve funds and also curtail
its functions to the detriment of the inhabitants of the
City.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TAX LEVIED BY THE DISTRICT IN
AUGUST 1961 WAS AND IS A VALID TAX.
The only question involved in this case having any
semblance of plausibility is whether the power of the
Board of Directors of the District to levy the 1961 tax
was affected by reason of the fact that the District had
accumulated a fund for the purpose of meeting emergencies likely or certain to arise. Appellants do not maintain that the tax was invalid because of the emergency
funds of the District. They skirt that proposition by
some objections to the tax which are so obscure and confusing as to obliterate each other.
Under Point I, Appellants state that "the basic
question involved is whether or not the City is entitled to
have payments for purchases of water from the District
applied to the reduction of taxes which would otherwise be
levied against the inhabitants or the City.'' Unless Appellants mean to inquire whether the District is required to
carry on its operations solely out of funds derived from
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the sale of water to the City, then the "basic question"
is a mere jumble of words. The statute expressly confers on the District authority to levy the tax to meet the
expenses of its operations, and obviously the income
which the District receives from the sale of water must
be used for the same purpose. What is accomplished by
requiring the District to use one source of income to neutralize another in whole or in part~ The ''crucial section''
of the Act which is said to bring about this absurdity is
73-8-43. This section does not even mention the subject of
payments for water sold and delivered. On the contrary,
it deals with voluntary payments which it permits the
City to make to the District but which the City is under
no obligation to make. These permissive payments can be
made out of funds not appropriated to any municipal
purpose or which have been derived by the City from
sales by it of water. If and when such voluntary payments are made by the City, the Section directs they must
be treated by the District as payments in advance for
water to be delivered to the City in the future or to avoid
taxes which would otherwise have to be levied against
the property in the District.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the City has
never had any funds which have not been appropriated
to any municipal purpose and which it could use to pay
in advance for water to be furnished by the District in the
future. Invariably, the City has to borrow money in anticipation of taxes in order to carry on its functions. It has
not at any time ever made any voluntary payments to
the District out of unappropriated funds or otherwise.
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Although the City does resell at a profit water which
it acquires from the District, it has never turned over
any of these profits or proceeds of sale to the District.
It is, therefore, idle to consider Section 73-8-43. It has
no application whatever to payments made by the City
to the District in satisfaction of a debt for ''goods sold
and delivered.''

It is extremely significant that for more than twentyfive years the City has made very substantial payments
for water each year without ever having so much as intimated to the District that the payments should be credited to any account or applied to any purpose other than
the satisfaction of the City's indebtedness.
Under Point II, Appellant says that the District has
no power to levy the 21j2 mill tax for the purpose of creat.,.
ing a surplus for future operating expenses or to acquire
water rights in the future, but that such tax was intended
solely for administering the District and operating its
properties during 1961. Such a proposition is unsupported by anything in the Metropolitan Water District
Act. The 1961 tax was levied to raise revenue to meet
the expenses of the District and not for creating a surplus for any purpose. The emergency fund was already
in existence and was not augmented in any way by the
1961 tax. As a matter of fact, no part of any prior 21;2
mill tax ever went into this fund. It was built up solely
from profit derived from the sale of water other than
water which ultimately reached the consumer within the
City. The water sold by the District to the City for distribution to the inhabitants was sold at less than cost to
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the District. The District sells substantial amounts of
water to private industry and also transports water for
municipalities and others. These sales and services produce considerable revenue. It also sells water to Salt Lake
City which the latter resells at a large profit to consumers outside the City. It is from these sources of revenue
that the District has built up the reserve fund under
consideration.
Appellant's contention that the District cannot use
any of the 21;2 mill tax revenue in furtherance of projects
to acquire water rights, but must submit all such projects
to a vote of the inhabitants of the City would be a grievous
misfortune to the taxpayer, if it were true. Obviously,
the statute requires the District to obtain the approval
of voters to such projects only as are to be financed
through the issuance of bonds to be paid out of a special
levy of taxes for that purpose. It is a tribute to the
efficiency of the District that it is able to finance important projects such as the $8,000,000 water treatment plant
without levying any special tax therefor. A moment's reflection by the individual plaintiff should convince him
that the contention .of the City Attorney on this point is
a definite dis-service to him as a taxpayer.
The last point asserted by the Appellants is that the
District must use the 1961 tax revenue solely for the purpose of discharging expenses of its operations during
tha:t year. If this is the correct meaning of the statute,
the District would soon be compelled to cease its operations. The 1961 tax would not be past due until December 1. By the time any substantial amount is received
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by the County and turned over to the District, the year
1961 is past and gone. Operating expenses whether those
of a public or private corporation must be paid as they
are incurred. If such expenses are deferred or ignored,
the operator is automatically out of business.
Appellants' interpretation of the statute is highly
strained and unrealistic to say the least. Section 73-8-36
directs only that before the 20th of August the Board of
Directors shall determine the amount of money necessary to be raised by taxation during the fiscal year beginning the first day of January next preceding, to meet interest and sinking fund requirements on bonded indebtedness and ''for all other District purposes.'' Nowhere in
the statute is there any requirement· that a tax levied
in any one year can be levied solely to meet expenses of
operations during that year. All that it specifies is that
the Board determine the amount of money necessary to
be raised by taxation during that year for interest, sinking fund and ''all District purposes.''
Admittedly, this Section is rather involved and confusing, but it manifestly was not intended to require the
District to carry on its operations by tax anticipation
borrowing, or go out of business.
POINT II.
THERE IS NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE DISTRICT AND
THE CITY AND ITS APPEAL SHOULD BE
DISMISSED.
The individual plaintiff alleged that he owned property in the City, that the District levied the tax against
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his property, and that the tax was invalid. He further
alleged that he had paid this tax under protest and was
entitled to recover it from the County which had collected it for the District. He sought a money judgment
against the County and a declaratory judgment against
the District.
The City joined in the allegations with respect to
the invalidity of the tax. It did not claim that the District
or the County had attempted to collect the tax from it
or that any of its property had been assessed. It sought
only a declaratory judgment.
Inasmuch as this misjoinder of plaintiffs is only a
procedural error, it will not be dwelt upon. An orderly
presentation of Respondent's case on appeal does, however, require us to separate these strange bedfellows.
The City asserts that the tax is invalid because the
District had on hand when the levy was made funds
which the City Attorney characterizes as a surplus. It
also alleged that the District could not levy taxes in one
fiscal year for operational expenses of subsequent fiscal
years. Its allegations that Section 73-8-43 requires the
District to credit against the tax the purchase price of
water received from the City for water sold and delivered
has already been shown to be a mere wild pitch.
We submit that the City has no legal capacity to
question the validity of the tax and that there is not and
cannot be any basis whatever for a controversy between.
it and the District which a court would have jurisdiction to determine.
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The tax which we are now considering is an ad
valorem tnx. It creates a lien on real property and can
be collected only from that source. Neither the City nor
the property owner is personally liable for the tax. The
only parties affected by the tax and who have any standing in court to question its validity are the owners of the
property upon which the tax is levied.
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides, so far as
the present case is concerned, that any person whose
rights, status or other legal relationships are affected by
a statute may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and obtain a
declaration of rights, status or other legal relationships
thereunder (Sec. 78-33-2, U. C. A. 1953).
A cursory examination of this Act reveals that it
does not create any substantive rights. It is purely remedial in character.
'' . . . The declaratory judgment procedure is
strictly remedial. The section does not create substantive rights or duties, but merely affords a
new, additional, and cumulative procedural method for their judicial determination. . . . '' State
Farm Mutual .Automobile Ins. Co. v. Morris, 173
N .E. 2d 590, 594.
In Sinclair Refining Compamy v. Bu.rrows, 133 F. 2d
536, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals said of the
Federal Act which does not differ materially from the
Utah Act:
'' ... The declaratory judgment act, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 400, created no new substantive rights. It is
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procedural in nature, designed to expedite the establishment of rights between parties when an
actual justiciable controversy exists between them
as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
question or controversy. The declaratory judgment must establish rights and declare liabilities
which as a result thereof may be enforced by the
prevailing party against the loser in a subsequent
action.''
Since the Act is remedial, the party invoking it must
have some right or interest in the subject matter which
will in the future need protection. If the right or interest
has already been invaded a coersive remedy is available
and there is no basis to maintain any action for declara:..
tory relief. Furthermore, the rights or interests of the
plaintiff must be adverse to those of the defendant. There
must be a real controversy as distinguished from a hypothetical dispute or a mere difference of opinion as to the
law. In State v. Darmma!J1JJib, 220 Wis. 17, 264 N.W. 627,
103 A.L.R. 1089, these requirements are thus summarized:
"(1) There must exist a justiciable controversy;
that is to say, a controversy in which a claim of
right is asserted against one who has an interest
in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)
the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a
legally protectible interest; and ( 4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination.''
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Professor Borchard in his treatise on Declaratory
Judgments says:

"It has already been observed that an action for
a declaratory judgment must exhibit all the usual
conditions of an ordinary action, except that
accomplished physical injury need not necessarily
be alleged. It is sufficient if a dispute or controversy as to legal rights is shown, which, in the
court's opinion, requires judicial determination
- that is, in which the court is convinced that by
adjudication a useful purpose will be served. The
requisites of justiciability must be present. Not
only must the plaintiff prove his tangible interest
in obtaining a judgment, but the action must be
adversary in character, that is, there must be a
controversy between the plaintiff and a defendant,
subject to the court's jurisdiction, having an interest in opposing his claim. Unless the parties
have such conflicting interests, the case is likely to
be characterized as one for an advisory opinion,
and the controversy as academic, a mere difference of opinion or disagreement not involving
their legal relations, and hence not justiciable.''
This Court is already committed to these propositions. See Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. 2d 251.
Millard County v. Millard County, etc., 86 Utah 475, 46
P. 2d 423.
The case made by the City fails completely to present
any of these necessary elements of a controversy which
a court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate. It has no
rights or interests that now need or ever will need protection or adjudication. It is not affected by the tax and
is in no way concerned with its enforcement. It has no
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property upon which the tax could be levied or assessed.
It is neither an inhabitant of the District nor a taxpayer
of any kind. It does not and could not have any legal
controversy with the District with respect to the statute
under which the District levied the tax and is without
legal capacity to maintain any proceeding against the
District. Its appearance in this action is totally
unwarranted.
In Boeing Airpl(J/YI;e Compa;ny v. Board of County
Commissioners, 164 Kan. 149, 188 P. 2d 429, 11 A.L.R. 2d
350, the Defense Plant Corporation leased a parcel of
land to Boeing Airplane Company. The lease provided
that the Lessee should pay all taxes lawfully imposed
upon the property. The Defense Plant Corporation transferred the leased premises to the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation subject to the lease. The Lessee then
brought suit against the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the County Officials to obtain a judgment declaring that it was not liable for the taxes. The court held
that there was no justiciable controversy between the
plaintiff and the County Officials for the reason that
the taxes were assessed against the land which the plaintiff did not own. It dismissed the appeal on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the action. The court said :
'' ... No actual controversy can exist in this case
between the company, which is the lessee of the
land, and the county officials. Such officials can
look only to the land and therefore can have a controversy in this case only with the owners of the
land. The company has only an option to purchase
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the real estate, may never exercise it and therefore never own it. It follows that there may never
develop an actual controversy between the company and the taxing officials. There must be two
sides to any actual controversy. In this case the
county officials cannot have an actual controversy
with the company because such officials cannot
contend that any obligation of any kind or character exists as between them and the company.... ''
In Day v. Board of Regents, etc., 36 P. 2d 262, the
plaintiff ''a resident, voter, elector and taxpayer''
brought an action to have the Basic Science Law of Arizona declared invalid. This law required all those who
practice the art of healing for hire to pass an examination on certain scientific subjects, and to pay a license
fee. The complaint did not disclose that the plaintiff
had ever practiced or that he ever intended to practice the art of healing for hire, and the court dismissed
the action upon the ground "It is the undisputed rule
that only those who are affected in some manner by a
statute may question its constitutionality.'' The Arizona statute relating to declaratory judgments is virtually identical to our own.

Thomas v. Riggs, 175 P. 2d 404, was another action
seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Idaho Coin Operated Amusement Device Control Act was unconstitutional and in conflict with the anti-gambling
statutes. Plaintiff described himself as a citizen and
taxpayer of the State of Idaho, and like many others
similarly situated opposed to the violation of the antigambling statutes. The court held that he lacked capacity
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to sue because he did not and could not assert any rights
or interests which were endangered or affected by the
Control Act. It said:
" ... Appellant, in the case at bar, did not allege
what legal right he enjoyed, if any, as either a citizen or taxpayer, was 'threatened or endangered.'
He alleged simply he was a citizen and taxpayer,
that he was opposed to gambling, and that the enforcement of the anti-gambling statute against
licensed slot machine operators was 'a matter of
grave public concern and moment.' But, again, appellant did not allege in what respect, if any, the
alleged failure to enforce the anti-gambling statutes, against licensed slot machine operators,_
'threatened or endangered' any personal, legal,
right he possessed.''
Since the City presented no justiciable controversy
and did not seek nor was entitled to any coercive relief,
the District Court lacked jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action so far as the City was concerned.
It necessarily follows that this Court likewise has no
jurisdiction of the City's appeal except to dismiss it.
POINT III.
DECLARATORY RELIEF IS DENIED
WHERE AN ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY
EXISTS OR WHERE BASED UPON CONTINGENT EVENTS.
The individual plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment to the effect that the District has no power to
levy the 1961 tax because the District had on hand what
he designates as a surplus. He also asks the Court to
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adjudicate that the District has no right to levy taxes
in one fiscal year for the purpose of carrying on operations in a subsequent fiscal year.
The tax assailed by the plaintiff has been levied,
assessed, and paid. Plaintiff paid the tax under protest
and seeks in this action to recover it from the County.
If, for any reason, the tax is invalid, the plaintiff's
remedy at law is complete and adequate, and there is
no occasion for him to seek the extraordinary remedy
of declaratory relief.
It may be conceded that declaratory relief may he
granted notwithstanding the existence of a legal or
equitable remedy. However, if the legal or equitable
remedy is adequate, declaratory relief is superfluous
and will be denied. The Declaratory Judgment Act
creates a new remedy and was not intended to replace
or modify existing remedies. To this effect are numerous authorities, some of which are cited below.
An even more cogent reason for denying the plaintiff a declaratory judgment is that it would be based
upon events that may never occur. It is by no means
certain that the district will at any future date have on
hand the so-called surplus funds. On the contrary it is
highly probable that the alleged surplus will be exhausted in carrying out the projects to obtain new
supplies of water and to meet emergencies which are
almost certain to arise. Neither is it absolutely certain
that the district will in the future levy a tax in one
year to cover expenses of operation of a subsequent
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year. The 21;2 mill limited tax is not a permanent tax
imposed by statute. It is assessed by the Directors of
the District after they have determined the amount of
money needed to carry on the operations of the District.
Both the amount of and the necessity for the tax are
matters contingent upon future events. The uncertainty
of their actual occurrence as well as the likelihood of
the so-called surplus being spent makes it legally impossible to render a valid declaratory judgment. Such
a judgment would constitute a mere legal opinion and
not a final or effective determination of any justiciable
controversy.
The principle is thus stated in Miller v. Stolinski,
32 N.W. 2d 199, 149 Nebr. 679:
''The Declaratory Judgments Act is applicable
only where there is a present actual controversy
and all interested persons are made parties, and
only where justiciable issues are presented. It
does not undertake to decide the legal effect of
laws upon a state of facts which is future, contingent, or uncertain. . . . "
See also Wolverine etc. v. Clark, 270, N.W. 167, 277
Mich. 633; Heller v. Shapiro, 242 N.W. 174, 208 Wis.
310; · West v. Wichita, 234 Pac. 978, 118 Kan. 265.

CONCLUSION
The 2lj2 mill tax levied by the District in August,
1961, for the purpose of raising revenue to carry on
the operations of the District was and is a valid and
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subsisting tax, and created a lien upon the taxable
property within the territorial limits of the District.
The power to levy this tax is expressly conferred upon
the District by the Metropolitan Water District Act.
This power is not qualified, limited or in any manner
affected by the fact that the District had accumulated
out of profits from its operation a fund for the purpose
of acquiring additional sources of supplies of water
without resorting to special taxation, and to meet emergencies which are certain to arise during periods of
drouth. The Act contains no provision preventing the
District from creating this fund or using it in the manner
which the Board of Directors is using and proposes to
use it. The creation, management and disposition of
this fund is a function of the District not subject to
supervision or control by the courts.
The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City
1s a public corporation, created for the purpose of
obtaining additional supplies of water for the benefit
primarily of the inhabitants of the District. It is completely independent of the City or any other municipal
corporation. "Each such District when so incorporated
shall be a separate and independent political corporate
entity." (Sec. 73-8-3) Neither the City nor any of its
officials has any power or authority whatsoever to
supervise, manage, control or direct any of the powers
or functions of the District or its Board of Directors.
The only relationship between the District and the City
is that of buyer and seller of water (Sec. 73-8-18, Subparagraph 1, and Section 73-8-31). The city is in no
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manner affected by or concerned with the tax involved
in this action. It has no rights or interests under the
Metropolitan Water District Act that have been invaded
or threatened with invasion by the District. Its interests
are neither adverse nor hostile to those of the District.
It has no dispute with the District that rises to the
dignity of a justiciable controversy and is without legal
capacity to maintain the action. Its appeal from the
judgment to that effect is frivolous and should be dismissed.
The case for the individual plaintiff is equally without foundation in law or in fact, although admittedly
he has legal capacity to sue for recovery of the tax
paid under protest. He has neither alleged nor proved
any facts which impair the validity of the tax. He is
not entitled to any declaratory relief because he does
not question the power of the District to levy the tax
in the future except under circumstances which may
never occur. The judgment rendered against him is
correct and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Grant H. Bagley, for
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY

FISHER HARRIS

Attorneys for Respondent
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